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8 December 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ADPC

SUBJECT:

Coordination ~~with~~ <sup>between</sup> Contact Division, OO

1. The question of coordination of OPC exploitation of non-governmental sources in the United States with the activities of the Contact Division, OO, has been a subject of discussion intermittently for almost a year. Pertinent documents are attached.
  2. A fresh approach to the problem has now been made, occasioned by an OO draft of a proposed new standard operating procedure - a draft which we find incompatible with efficient and secure operation of OPC in carrying out its assigned mission.
  3. In reviewing the history of this matter it becomes obvious that there has been a deep-seated feeling within OO that [REDACTED] by OPC, in some way encroach on the functions and mission of OO.
  4. It then follows that in order to resolve the question, what is required is a positive statement of procedure to govern these contacts which will:
    - a. Provide assurance that OPC will in no way be hindered in the proper execution of its assigned mission;
    - b. Provide similar assurance to OO that these necessary activities of OPC will in no way interfere with OO's legitimate mission.
- In this connection, as a practical matter, it is believed that the tone and the content of the statement should be such as to allay the apparent fears of OO to the maximum extent compatible with "a" above.
5. The attached draft of a proposed CIA Administrative Memorandum appears to conform to the specifications in paragraph 4 and it is suggested that it be presented to OO in that light.

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6. For your background information in discussion with OO, certain points seem worth noting:

a. The overall outline of OO's functions contained in the official "Organization and Functions of CIA", dated 7 February 1949 (and not amended to date) describes OO as "a centralized collection service for CIA and IAC agencies."

The specific functions of Contact Division (then Contact Branch) as outlined are entirely related to the exploitation of foreign positive intelligence.

(One possibly controversial sentence reads "clears, coordinates, controls and assists contacts with these sources for the collection of foreign intelligence information by other components of CIA and by the IAC agencies.")

b. The function of OPC is operations - not intelligence.

c. OPC recognizes and respects the primary obligation and responsibility of OO in the exploitation of [REDACTED] sources, for foreign positive intelligence. This is not OPC's interest in such sources, even though the sources may sometimes be common to both offices.

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d. Therefore, the functions of the two organizations do not conflict, and any sources of apparent conflict in execution of the assigned missions can be easily resolved. The attached draft is a sincere attempt to do this.

e. The question of aliens and defectors has not been specifically mentioned in the draft, since this is currently being discussed as a separate problem. However, sources of these types can be considered as included in the proposed draft, in the absence of further administrative instructions.

f. The OO draft impinges on the legitimate functions of I&S and of Personnel, as well as of OPC. (The approach recommended is not to rebut the OO proposal but to present a counter-proposal of our own; but the above point could be borne in mind in any case.)

g. OSO (along with all other CIA offices except OPC) agreed in April 1949 to a draft proposal made by OO for [REDACTED] OSO made certain concessions in so agreeing.

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However, [REDACTED] in a memorandum dated 14 April 1949 agreed that the draft did not meet the OPC problem, and that suitable arrangements would be worked out mutually at a later date.

Thus no concession of OSO can now be used as a lever on OPC.

h. The draft proposal is intended to establish a working agreement in the future. The question of contacts already made by OPC outside the cognizance of OO, or of intelligence material of general interest already secured by OPC, are outside the scope of the paper.

i. The question of exploiting intelligence potential of OPC contacts is covered by paragraph 5. of draft Administrative Instruction. Once OPC notifies OO of a new contact the initiative of exploiting the intelligence potential of that source passes to OO, subject to coordination with OPC.

If these matters become an issue, their retroactive settlement could be worked out within the framework of the proposal.

7. A note of caution: Although the "organizations and functions of CIA" referred to in paragraph 6.a. have not been revised since February, a revision is expected to appear in three to four weeks time. Whether OO's functions will be materially changed in that revision we do not know.

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[REDACTED]  
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/s/ [REDACTED]

COP

I believe that the draft should be discussed with you at your convenience. I am somewhat worried that the attached draft might tie our hands in respect to personnel security.

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SADO has seen and concurred at 1145, 9 December 1949

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AREA OR COUNTRY(S)	APPROPRIATE AGENCY	GENERAL FUNCTION(S)	SPECIAL FUNCTION(S)	DOC DATE CLASS
HQ	OPC	DDP	Coordination	8 Dec
	OO		Liaison (intra-agency)	1949
			Domestic ops	
			Agreement	

IDENTIFICATION OF DOCUMENT

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Memo from [redacted] and [redacted] to DCPD and COP. Subject: Coordination with Contact Division, OO forwarding proposed memo from them to ADPC.

ABSTRACT NOTATION REFERENCES

States that OO draft of proposed new standard operating procedure, i.e., Administrative Instruction re relationship between OPC and OO, is incompatible with efficient and secure operation of OPC. Attaches proposed draft revision of Administrative Instruction and explains background of coordination problems.

DOCUMENT LOCATION

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